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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
As indicated by the Appellant, the Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
over this case in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), but has transferred the
case to this court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARD OF REVIEW,
AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUES
1. Was the Provo City Board of Adjustment's determination regarding the
illegality of Petitioner's basement apartment arbitrary, capricious, or illegal?
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals reviews the decision of a Board of
Adjustment "as if the appeal had come directly from the agency." Patterson v. Utah
County Bd. of Adjustment 893 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah App. 1995). Accordingly, the
standard of review is the same as that stated in the Utah Code for the district court's
review. Id. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3) such review shall presume the
Board's decision is valid. "Thus, the Board's actions are accorded substantial deference
and will be rejected on appeal only if they are so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and
capricious or if they violate the law." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 603. "[T]he Board's
decision can only be considered arbitrary and capricious if not supported by substantial
evidence." Id., at 604. This Court elsewhere stated that substantial evidence is "more
than a mere 'scintilla'" of evidence . . . . though 'something less than the weight of the
evidence.'" Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989)
(quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunicutt 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985), in turn quoting
Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607 (1966)). Thus, in considering the question of substantial
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evidence, this Court "must simply determine, in light of the evidence before the Board,
whether a reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion as the Board. It is not [the
Court of Appeals'] prerogative to weigh the evidence anew." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604.
The Petitioner bears the burden of proving that the Board erred. Utah Code Ann. § 109a-705.
Appellant correctly indicates that this issue was raised before both the Board and
the Fourth District Court. R. 341; R. 92-91.
2. Is the Petitioner barred from raising her estoppel argument by her failure to
raise this issue with the Board of Adjustment?
Standard of Review: The question of issue preservation was obviously not
presented to the Board of Adjustment as this question can only arise after the Board's
decision is appealed. This question was raised in the District Court by Respondent and
acknowledged by the judge. R. 322; R. 341-340. However, the District Court did not
clearly rule on this question in its ruling or findings of fact. R. 342-336; R. 350-346.
Perhaps this is because the District Court found that the city file that Petitioner claims to
have relied upon was not "dispositive of the legal status of the basement apartment." R.
337. Based on that finding, the District Court may have believed the estoppel argument
was moot because there was not a clear or definitive act of the City for the Petitioner to
have relied upon. As the District Court did not explicitly rule on Respondent's argument,
there is no underlying decision for this Court to review for correctness.
3. If the issue of estoppel was preserved, is Petitioner nonetheless barred from raising it against a governmental entity?
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Standard of Review: As the estoppel argument has not previously been ruled on
in this case, it was not preserved at the Board of Adjustment and Petitioner's claim of
equitable estoppel is not properly before this Court.
4. If Petitioner's estoppel argument is not barred, did Petitioner reasonably rely to
her detriment upon a clear and definite act of the Respondents thus resulting in the
Respondents being estopped from finding Petitioner's basement apartment to be illegal?
Standard of Review: Petitioner's statement of the standard of review regarding
this issue is potentially misleading. As Petitioner indicates, a claim of equitable estoppel
is, indeed, a mixed question of law and fact. However, Petitioner asserts that none of the
underlying facts of her estoppel claim are in dispute and asserts on that basis that, as in
Taylor v. Utah State Training School 775 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah App. 1989), the
"correction-of-error" standard should apply because the issue is a question of law only,
not requiring the application of basic facts from the case.
In fact, the facts upon which Petitioner's argument relies are very much in dispute.
As an examination of the Board's Report of Action reveals, if the findings of fact of the
Board of Adjustment are accepted, Petitioner's estoppel argument cannot stand. R. 291 288. Accordingly, this issue remains a mixed question of law and fact. As such, a
spectrum of different standards from correctness to abuse of discretion has been applied
by the appellate courts. Terry v. Retirement Bd., Public Employees' Health Program,
2007 UT App 87, 157 P.3d 362, 364, (citing Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177
(Utah 1997)). The proper standard of review depends on such things as the agency's
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expertise in a given area of law, the complexity of the legal question, and the policy
concerns involved. Id
In this case, the question of estoppel is not one within the Board of Adjustment's
special purview, so a correction of error standard does apply to the Board's interpretation
of the law of estoppel and the application of the facts to it. Id.; Taylor, 775 P.2d at 434.
However, the Board's findings of fact related to this argument should still be reviewed
under the substantial evidence standard described above. Drake, 939 P.2d at 181.
As noted above, and discussed more thoroughly in the Argument section below,
Respondents do not believe this issue was raised before the Board. Petitioner cites in her
brief several sections of the record to support her claim that this issue was raised before
the board. However, these sections, parsed thoroughly below, stand only for the
propositions that (1) Petitioner believed at the time of the hearing that City's case file
indicated a determination of legal nonconforming use in 1983 or (2) that Petitioner
concluded from all the evidence she reviewed that the basement apartment was legal at
the time she was purchasing it. R. 182:139 to 181:140-147; R. 186:44-46; R. 167:449454; and R. back of 276:2-5. Nowhere in the record, prior to the appeal to the Fourth
District Court, did Petitioner specifically mention estoppel or generally allege that she
bought the house specifically in reliance on the notes in the city's 22 year old case file.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-705:

~~

The appellant has the burden of proving that the land use authority erred.
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Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3):
(a) The courts shall:
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority
of this chapter is valid; and
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative
discretion is valid if it is reasonably debatable that the decision, ordinance, or
regulation promotes the purposes of this chapter and is not otherwise illegal
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the"
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal.
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision,
ordinance, or regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time
the decision was made or the ordinance or regulation adopted.
Utah Rule App. Proc. 24(a)(9):
An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing
any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes,
and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking
to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and
set forth the legal basis for such an award.
Provo City Code Chapter 14.36: See Addendum, Exhibit A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Petitioner purchased a home within a residential zone where only single-family

dwellings are permitted. Petitioner desires to rent out the basement of the home and

-

claims the right to a nonconforming use. This case arises on appeal from the denial by
the Provo City Board of Adjustment of Petitioner's request to find such a nonconforming
use.
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B.

Procedural History and Disposition Below

1. On April 24, 2006, Provo City staff issued a Zone Verification on the property located
at 1295 Cedar Avenue, Provo, Utah. R. 69. The Zone Verification stated that the
property was within a One Family Residential Zone and that the legal use of the property
was as a One Family Dwelling only.
2. Paragraphs 4-10 of the Procedural History section of Appellant's Opening Brief
(found at pages 7-8) accurately detail the subsequent history and disposition, with the
minor exception that in paragraph 7, Respondent's motion which was denied was actually
Defendant's Motion to Strike Petitioner's Notice of Intent to File Summary Judgment
Motion. R. 341
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. Petitioner's residence, which is the center of this claim, is located at 1295 Cedar
Avenue, Provo, Utah 84604. R. back of 285. The current zoning of the residence is Zone
R1.8 - One Family Residential Zone, which allows only single family occupancy. R. 69.
2. The residence was built in 1949 and 1950 by Leonard C. and Laura R. Madsen
("Original Owners"). R. 270. During that period, the property location was within an
Agricultural District, which permitted two-family dwellings. R. back of 291.
3. The building permit for the property listed the building type as a "Dwelling." R. 270.
Building permits from that time period and area for multi-family dwellings typically were
explicit about the multi-family nature of the building, using terms such as "duplex" or
"two-family dwelling." R. 114; R. 131; R. back of 37.
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4. In 1954, the property's zoning changed. Since that time the relevant zoning
ordinances have allowed single-family dwellings only. R. back of 291.
5. The Original Owners, who are now deceased, remained at the residence until 1961. R.
back of 282. Their daughter, Toni Shain, was contacted by various individuals involved
in this case, including Petitioner. R. 106; R. 139:49-138:63. Mrs. Shain stated to these
individuals that there was no kitchen in the basement. R. 130; R. 106; R. back of 61; R.
41. To the Petitioner, Mrs. Shain said that she did not remember there being a kitchen
and did not think there was one. R. 138:57-60; R. back of 99. Mrs. Shain also told
Petitioner that she remembered her mother cooking for the renters on occasion. R. 138:
57-60. She told Petitioner that the basement had a separate entrance. R. back of 99. It is
not clear whether Mrs. Shain remembered there being a bathroom in the basement. R.
138: 56-57; R. back of 99. She did remember renters staying in the basement, but the
record doesn't reflect any statement as to whether the renters' presence was continuous or
intermittent. R. 138; R. back 99. In her conversation with Ray Christensen, the Wasatch
Neighborhood Chair, Mrs. Shain referred to the renters occupying "sleeping rooms,"
common parlance in that day for boarding rooms rather than a formal apartment. R. 130;
R. 61;R.41.
6. Petitioner had a plumber inspect the basement plumbing of the residence. R. back of
286. The plumber concluded that the plumbing for the basement sink and bathroom was
installed at the time the house was built. Id. During Petitioner's hearing before the
Board, one Board member, Leonard Mackay, gave as his opinion, based on Petitioner's
photographs of the plumbing and his personal knowledge of plumbing, that the plumbing
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on the kitchen sink "was a clean out that something was added to later." R. 117. He also
stated that he believed the shower drain to have originally been a standard flood drain
that was later made into a shower by adding a rim directly on the previously laid flooring
tile. R. 116
7. In 1961, Jean and LaVerne Paulson ("Second Owners") purchased the residence from
the Madsens. R. back of 282. The Second Owners owned the home until January 1963.
R. 250. The eldest son of the Second Owners, J. Douglas Paulson ("Mr. Paulson"),
provided an affidavit regarding his knowledge about this purchase. R. back of 98. The
home was purchased when his father went to work at BYU. Id. Mr. Paulson's mother
remained in California. Id. Apparently, Mr. Paulson never lived in the Cedar Avenue
house, although he visited it on several occasions. Id. Mr. Paulson's understanding was
that the ability to have renters in the basement was a "main factor" in his parents'
decision to purchase the home. Id. To his knowledge, students lived in the basement
throughout his parent's ownership of the home. Id. Mr. Paulson further affirmed that the
living facilities in the basement were completely separate and included cooking facilities,
although the record contains some contradictions as to whether he actually met any of the
renters. Id.; R. 138: 74-76. To his knowledge, his parents never did any remodeling. R.
back of 98.
8. Byron and Edna Done ("Third Owners") bought the home from the Paulsons in
January 1963 and owned it until Mrs. Done died in January 2006. R. 250. Several
documents relating to this purchase are found in the record. R. 79-back of 76; R. 63.
These documents refer to renters living both upstairs and downstairs. R. back of 79; R.
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63. They also discuss whether certain furniture in the house will be included in the sale
or retained by the Paulsons. Specifically, these references refer to furniture downstairs
and kitchen appliances upstairs (a stove and refrigerator). R. 79; R. back of 77; R. back
of 76. None of the letters refer to kitchen appliances downstairs. R. 79-back of 76; R.
63.
9. Polk & Cole Directories list one family residing at the residence prior to 1967. R.
back of 107. The directories then show only one listing from 1974 to 1990. R. back of
68. Two names are sporadically listed from 1990 to 2002. IcL
10. During their ownership, the Third Owners undertook various remodeling projects.
They "updated" the downstairs "kitchen" in 1963, but according to their daughter,
Jeanine Gunn, did not install it. R. 97. According to Ray Christensen, the Wasatch
Neighborhood Chair, neighbors observed that prior to 1964 the carport was converted
into a kitchen and the kitchen (on the main floor) was made into a formal dining area. R.
back of 60. This remodel also involved moving the washer and dryer from elsewhere in
the home. Id. A carport and parking pad were also added in the front yard setback. R.
69. No building permit was found in the City's records for any of these changes. Id, A
building permit from 1966 does show the addition of a second floor to the residence. R.
90. Mr. Christensen stated that the style of construction of the basement kitchen is
consistent with the style of these modifications made in the 1960s rather than the style of
the initial construction. R. back of 37.
11. The Third Owners had renters in the basement during at least some periods of their
ownership. R. 74. Their daughter states that "mother often had young couples living as
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tenants." R. back of 75. The City opened a case file in 1983 in response to a complaint
about the presence of renters in the home. R. 74. In response to this investigation, the
Third Owners' son-in-law, John Hansen, Jr., wrote a letter asserting that the Third
Owners had a "grandfather" right to have a basement apartment. He asserted that the
Third Owners had owned the house for over 15 years and had continuously had students
renting from them. R. 74 and back of 74. He requested the City find some way to record
that this was not the first time that such complaints had been raised. R. back of 74.
Accordingly, the text of his letter was typed into the City's case file. R. 74. The case file
indicates a "Comp Date" of 84/6/29 without explaining what this means. R. back of 74.
The case file then states that the status is "Closed" followed by a line reading
"Conformed-Nonconforming." R. back of 74. The record is silent as to whether this case
file was ever presented to the Third Owners or whether they ever received any other
statement from the City regarding the legality or illegality of a basement apartment in
their residence.
12. Several neighbors testified before the Board as to periods during which the Third
Owners were not renting out the basement. Andrew Gustafson, who lives two houses
down the street, testified that Mrs. Done (the Third Owner) was his daughter's best friend
and that he had personal knowledge that there were long periods of time during which the
Third Owners did not have people living in the basement. R. 125. Lisa Wygant stated
she had lived next door to the Third Owners since 1993 and indicated that there were
occasional long periods of at least six months during which there were no renters in the
residence. R. 123. Specifically, she knew there had been no renters during the last two
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years of Mrs. Done's life. R. 122. DeAnn Gardner presented testimony that she had
been Mrs. Done's friend for 40 years and that her backyard bordered on Mrs. Done's. R.
124. She described two periods of at least six months during which the basement was not
rented out—in 2001 and again in 2003. Id. Mrs. Gardner related that Mrs. Done asserted
in 2001 that her apartment was "grandfathered," but she also testified that in 2003 she
confirmed with City staff that a nonconforming use would be deemed abandoned if
unused for six months. Id. Mrs. Done's response was, "well, I don't really care whether
I lose it or not, it's nice, I enjoy the privacy of not having anyone there, I don't care, it
gives me the opportunity to let my grandchildren come and stay there if they need a place
to stay so it really doesn't matter to me." R. 124-123.
13. Other documents in the record also reflect period of non-rental, or at least lack of
history. David Armond, the Wasatch Neighborhood Chair around the time of Petitioner's
purchase of the residence, observed in an email that several neighbors helped a family
move out of the basement in April 2004 and the basement had not been rented out
between that time and March 2006. R. 75. Petitioner, in a letter addressed to Provo
Mayor Lewis K. Billings, dated May 3, 2006, stated that "no one is sure at this time what
the status has been since April of 2004," but also stated that the Third Owners had
contracted to rent the apartment in December 2005, although they decided not to place
the renters. R. 70. In a letter dated August 3, 2006, Petitioner stated that "the use of
basement apartment has not been well documented." R. back of 25.
14. During her purchase of the home, Petitioner dealt with the seller's realtor, John
Wallace. R. back of 71. Mr. Wallace conveyed to Petitioner and her father that, at a

minimum, there would be controversy and opposition associated with renting out the
basement. R. 120:435-437; R. 120:448-454; R. 65. Petitioner understood she needed to
comply with zoning laws, but she did not request a Zone Verification. R. 65.
15. On March 1, 2006, Mr. Wallace requested a Zone Verification from Provo City staff.
R. back of 63.
16. On April 21, 2006, Petitioner bought the residence without having received a Zone
Verification. R. 186; R. 65. On April 24, 2006, Provo City staff sent the requested Zone
Verification to Mr. Wallace. R. 69. On that same date, Petitioner also obtained a letter
from the Third Owners' daughter, Jeanine Gunn, regarding her knowledge of the history
of the basement apartment, although Petitioner was not made aware of the Zone
Verification until April 26, 2006. R. back of 67; R. 66; R. back of 71.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Petitioner's appeal should be denied both on the grounds that the Board of
Adjustment's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal and that Petitioner's
estoppel argument is barred and flawed.
In order to successfully argue for reversal of the Board's decision, Petitioner must
prove that there was not substantial evidence supporting the Board's decision. Petitioner
claims a nonconforming use of a basement apartment for property and had the burden to
demonstrate to the Board that this use existed prior to changes in zoning law that made
the use illegal and that the nonconforming use has not been abandoned. The record
shows first that the Board reviewed substantial evidence that the use did not exist prior to
the 1954 zoning law. This evidence consisted of a building permit typical of single-
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family dwellings, statements from Toni Shain that there was no kitchen, and evidence
demonstrating that any renters were likely boarders only.
Substantial evidence also was reviewed by the Board sufficient to allow a
reasonable person to conclude that if there had been a nonconforming use, it had been
abandoned. This consisted of statements from several neighbors as to periods of non-use
sufficient to raise a statutory presumption of abandonment and statements of the Third *
Owner that she did not care about preserving any nonconforming use. In contrast to this,
was presented only broad generalizations that over the years the basement had been
rented out, unsupported by any detailed records.
Petitioner also claims that the Board was estopped from making a determination
that the apartment was illegal due to Petitioner's detrimental reliance on a twenty-twoyear-old case file notation. This claim fails for a number of reasons. First, it was not
raised before the Board, and is, therefore, not properly raised here. Second, estoppel may
generally not be invoked against government entities and this case does not meet the
exceptional circumstances that allow exceptions to that rule. Third, the record
demonstrates that the City did perform a clear and definitive act. Finally, the Petitioner
has not shown that she actually relied on the document or that such reliance would have
been reasonable.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE BOARD'S DECISION WAS NOT CLEARLY ARBITRARY,
CAPRICIOUS, OR ILLEGAL AS THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT AND PETITIONER DID NOT MEET HER
BURDEN OF PROOF BEFORE THE BOARD.
Appellant claims the Board of Adjustment's decision must be overturned on the

basis that it is arbitrary, capricious, and illegal Appellant, has made no allegation that.
the Board violated a specific law in reaching its decision. Therefore, her claim rests on
the argument that the decision was arbitrary or capricious. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a801(3)(d). As Petitioner notes, the Board's decision "can only be considered arbitrary or
capricious if not supported by substantial evidence." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604. The
question before this Court then is "in light of the evidence before the Board, whether a
reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion as the Board." Patterson, 893 P.2d at
604. Petitioner has the burden to prove that a reasonable mind could not do so. Utah
Code Ann. § 10-9a-705.
A.

There Are Only Two Relevant Questions of Fact to the Question of
Whether Petitioner Has a Legal Nonconforming Use,

Despite the length of the record there are only two findings of fact by the Board
that are relevant to this appeal. In order to prove a valid nonconforming use, Petitioner
needed to convince the Board that: (1) the, now nonconforming, use was established prior
to the change in zoning laws that would make the use currently illegal; and (2) the
nonconforming use, once established, has not been abandoned during the period since it
was established. Provo City Code Chapter 14.36.040 and 14.36.090.
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Because Petitioner is challenging the findings of fact of the Board, Petitioner has a
duty to marshal the evidence. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 164 P.3d 384, 390
(Utah 2007). Utah Rule App. Proc. 24(a)(9) states that "[a] party challenging a fact
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."
"[PJarties that fail to marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing court will
decline, in its discretion, to review the [agency's] factual findings." Martinez, 164 P.3d
at 390. As shown in the following sections, and by a comparison of the Statement of
Facts in each brief, Petitioner has failed to meet this duty. Petitioner has consistently
disparaged the evidence supporting Respondents' decision as being meager and unworthy
of merit or consideration without fulfilling this duty to first marshal the evidence and then
demonstrate why it may be insufficient.
B.

Substantial Evidence Was Presented That a Nonconforming Use Was
Never Established.

A review of the evidence presented to the Board shows that there was sufficient
evidence to allow a reasonable mind to conclude that a nonconforming use of Petitioner's
property was never established. The specific question is whether or not the residence at
1295 Cedar Avenue was a legal two-family dwelling prior to 1954 when the zoning of
that location changed to allow only single-family dwellings. The evidence before the
Board regarding both the construction of the house and the use of the residence
constitutes substantial evidence that it was not used as a two-family dwelling prior to
1954.
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1.

Evidence regarding the manner of construction of the residence
does not establish that it was a two-family dwelling.

Petitioner attempted to convince the Board that the residence was originally
constructed as a two-family dwelling. However, the evidence of this was meager at best
and was contradicted by evidence to the contrary.
Petitioner places great emphasis on the fact that the basement of the home was
built with a separate entrance and may have had a sink and a bathroom. It is undisputed
that the basement had a separate entrance. However, this fact has little real significance.
As indicated by Mr. Christensen, the slope of the land in this area is such that it is
possible to have a walkout basement on many of the lots in the area. R. back of 39. This
is, in fact, the case. Seven other homes on the street have basements. R. back of 36. Of
those seven, six have (or had at some point) a separate entrance to the basement. IcL The
existence of such a door does not demonstrate the existence of an apartment.
In fact, the significance of this fact is further decreased by the evidence before the
Board that the upstairs and downstairs portions of the home were not completely
separate. Ray Christensen testified that Edna Done (the Third Owner) had "regularly
complained when she got into disputes with her renters, they were putting things in her
storage area downstairs." R. 131. This indicates a connection between the two areas of
the house. Andrew Gustafson, a neighbor and father of a close friend of Mrs. Done, also
indicates that the division between the upstairs and the downstairs was not "definitive."
R. 127. The only person who indicates the upstairs and downstairs were "completely
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separate" is the son of the Second Owners who never lived in the house and whose
parents only owned it for two years over forty years ago. R. back of 98
Similarly, the presence of a bathroom and/or a sink, even if undisputed, does not
establish the presence of an apartment. Many single-family homes have multiple
bathrooms and there are a number of reasons to include a sink in the basement, the most
common being to utilize it for laundry. The Board did in fact hear testimony that within
the first year of purchasing the home, the Third Owners moved the laundry facilities as
part of a remodel of the main floor kitchen and dining room. R. back of 60. Perhaps the
laundry facilities were relocated from near the basement sink.
However, it is not even clear that there was a basement sink or bathroom at the
time the house was constructed. Mrs. Shain, the daughter of the original owners, told the
Petitioner that she could not say whether there was a sink downstairs. R. back of 99. As
to the presence of a bathroom, Petitioner quoted Mrs. Shain as saying that there was a
bathroom and that she couldn't remember if there was a bathroom. R. back of 99; R.
138:56-57.
Petitioner did present evidence to the Board by means of an affidavit from a
plumber who inspected the pipes and concluded that uall the plumbing for the bathroom
and kitchen sink was installed at the time the house was built." R. back of 102. Based
solely on the plumber's affidavit though, it is unclear precisely what this means. Since
the inspection was of the piping, it is not clear whether he determined that the sink and
bathroom fixtures were actually in place, or merely that the piping to which they are now
connected was present. The latter conclusion is supported by Petitioner's admission
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before the Board that she could not get an expert opinion on whether the kitchen sink was
original. R. 136. Further, one Board member based on the pictures and his plumbing
experience presented an alternate view. R. 117. Admittedly, the Board member does not
appear to be a professional plumber and his testimony may not carry the same weight.
But taken together with Mrs. Shain's statement that she did not remember a sink, this
evidence could reasonably allow the Board to conclude that Petitioner did not meet her
burden of proof.
More to the point, regardless of the existence of a basement sink, the evidence
clearly shows that there was not a kitchen. Mrs. Shain told three people, including
Petitioner, that there was not a kitchen in the basement. In Petitioner's affidavit
regarding her conversation with Mrs. Shain, she attempts to portray this as simply a
failure of Mrs. Shain's memory. R. back of 99. However, in her testimony to the Board,
Petitioner states that Mrs. Shain affirmatively did not believe there was a kitchen because
she remembered her mother cooking for the renters in the basement on occasion. R. 138.
The Board also heard evidence that the building permit for the residence was not
consistent with Petitioner's assertion that it originated as a two-family dwelling. The
building permit for this residence lists the building type as a "Dwelling." R. 270. The
Board received evidence from multiple sources, including the Board Chair based on her
many years of experience on the Board of Adjustment, that building permits from that
time period that contemplated construction of a multi-family dwelling were typically
explicit about the multi-family nature of the building, using terms such as "duplex" or
"two-family dwelling." R. 114; R. 131; R. back of 37. Petitioner disparages this
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evidence on the basis that she has not seen any such permits. Appellant's Opening Brief,
at 22. However, she provides no contrary evidence and there is no reason to doubt the
affirmations of the Board and staff members that their experience is as they claim it to be.
2.

Evidence regarding the use of the basement prior to 1954 does
not establish that the house was a two-family dwelling.

Petitioner claims that the basement of the house was used as a separate apartment
prior to 1954. However, there is a near complete dearth of any evidence to this effect.
The only evidence of the basement's use from any source is Mrs. Shain's statement that
she remembers renters in the basement. R. back of 99; R. 38. A complete review of Mrs.
Shain's statements indicates not the use of a basement apartment, but the presence in her
parents' home of roomers or boarders. As discussed above, Mrs. Shain affirmatively
states there was no kitchen in the basement and remembers her mother cooking for the
basement renters. R. 138. When Mr. Christensen spoke with Mrs. Shain, she referred to
the basement area as "sleeping rooms." R. 130. As Mr. Christensen testified, this was a
common term in the 1950s used to indicate a "rooming" or "boarding" situation where
renters (often BYU students) rented a room for sleeping that did not include formal
cooking facilities. R. 130.
The mere presence of renters, taken together with the definite evidence about the
lack of a kitchen, at best establishes that the Original Owners had roomers or boarders,
not an apartment. This is further supported by the absence of listings for a second family
in the Pole & Cole Directories for this neighborhood all the way up to 1967.
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3.

Substantial evidence was also presented to justify the Board's
rejection of Petitioner's contention that Provo City ratified an
existing nonconforming use in 1984.

By far the most contentious piece of evidence in the case is a two page document
labeled Provo City Community Development Case File. R. 74. This record documents
that on October 26, 1983 City staff inspected the residence at 1295 Cedar Ave as the
result of a complaint that the residence had been made into two units and was being
occupied by two families. Id This complaint is, in and of itself, interesting in that it
shows that the City had no record of this being a two-family dwelling and that one or
more of the neighbors believed that the separation of the house into two separate units
had only recently occurred. The inspectors made contact with a tenant who confirmed
the double occupancy.
The file then indicates that a letter was sent to the owners on October 27, 1983, At
some subsequent point, a letter was received from John Hansen, Jr., the son-in-law of the
Third Owners. The text of this letter was entered into the Case File, presumably to
preserve it, given Mr. Hansen's urging that the City record the information somehow. R.
back of 74. The case file indicates no further action by anyone. No collection of
evidence is documented and the spaces to indicate action by the Council, the Planning
Commission, and the Board of Adjustment are all blank.
The only additional data on the case file are (1) an indication that the "Comp
Date," whatever that is, was June 29, 1984; (2) a notation that the status is "Closed"; and
(3) the words "Conformed-Nonconforming." R. back of 74. Petitioner contends that this
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enigmatic document is a clear statement that in 1984 the City documented a valid
nonconforming use for the property in question. This contention strains credulity. How
can a property be both conformed and nonconforming at the same time? If there is a
nonconforming use, what is it? Is it a nonconforming apartment or a nonconforming
right to boarders? Why would the author spend an entire paragraph detailing the nature
of the complaint and two, mutually exclusive, words describing the complete abrogation
of the current zoning ordinance in effect for the property? Why would the City not have
sent a confirmation detailing such a decision to the property owner? Why would the
property owner who saved letters dating back to the purchase of the house not save such a
letter if one was sent?
A number of hypotheses have been put forth regarding the meaning of this two
word notation, some more likely than others: Was "confirmed" misspelled as
"conformed"? Was it even actually a notation? Or is it the heading to a data field (like
"Status") that never got filled in? Was the staff supposed to circle one? Or perhaps, did
the notation generically signify that the case was closed successfully because the property
either "conformed" (stopped the illegal use) or was "nonconforming"?
Unfortunately, no one knows and the Board was not presented any evidence as to
the definitive interpretation of the document. So based on its utter ambiguity, and the
totality of the other evidence that there was not an existing nonconforming use, the Board
decided not to view the case file notation as granting a nonconforming use. For instance,
the Board received evidence that the Third Owners had engaged in a variety remodeling
and construction projects with regard to the house since they moved in, the majority done
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without a building permit. These included remodeling the main floor kitchen, adding a
main floor formal dining room, building a carport and parking pad, some degree of
"updating" the downstairs "kitchen;" and adding a second story (this last being the only
project for which a building permit was obtained). R. 97; R. back of 60; R. 69; R. 90; R.
back of 37. Such evidence would support a reasonable conclusion that Mrs. Done did
not, in fact, have a prior nonconforming use and that she had been perhaps responsible
for upgrading the, probably already illegal, use of the basement by boarders to a full
apartment use. (It is interesting in this regard that the first time the neighborhood
directories show an additional family in the home is in 1967, shortly after the Done
family probably completed their remodeling projects given the 1966 building permit. R.
107.) It would also, based on that analysis, support a rejection of Petitioner's view of the
case file document. The Petitioner did not meet her burden of proof to convince the
Board otherwise, and the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents submit that there was substantial evidence
for the Board to make a finding of fact that the residence was not constructed as a twofamily dwelling nor used as one prior to 1954 and that the Third Owner, Mrs. Done, was
not granted a nonconforming use by Provo City in 1984.
C.

Substantial Evidence Was Presented That, If a Nonconforming Use
Was Established, It Was Abandoned.

Even were the Court to find that the Board erred regarding the establishment of the
nonconforming use, in order for her claim to succeed, Petitioner would also have to
demonstrate that the right to a nonconforming apartment, once established, was never
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abandoned. This she was unable to do before the Board and there is substantial evidence
to support the Board's decision.1 There were three different owners of the residence prior
to Petitioner. Petitioner presented scant evidence regarding the first two and, with regard
to the third, substantial evidence supports a finding of abandonment.2
1.

There is little evidence to support Petitioner's contention that
the first two owners continuously rented the basement

Petitioner's only evidence that the Original Owners continuously rented the
basement from 1954, when the zoning ordinance changed, until 1961, when they sold the
property is general assertion of Mrs. Shain that she remembers renters in the basement.
Mrs. Shain made no assertions and Petitioner presented no evidence as to the timeframe
in which the basement was rented or the continuity of the rental. On the other hand, the
Board received City staffs research showing no additional families listed in the home in
the neighborhood directories for the entire period of the Original Owners's ownership.
R. back of 68. (In fact, the directories don't show and additional families during the
ownership of the Second Owners either. Id.) This supports the contention, discussed
above, that when there were renters, they were merely boarders.
The son of the Second Owners, Mr. Paulson, did submit a statement that there
were students living in the basement "throughout the duration of [his] parent's ownership

1

And, as indicated earlier, Petitioner fails to marshal the evidence before attacking the
Board's finding as she is required to do.
2
Petitioner contends that the Board did not make a finding of abandonment. The Report
of Action does not contain a formal finding of abandonment as the finding that there was
never a nonconforming use made that question moot. However, the Board's comments
before ruling make it clear that the Board believed if the use had been established it
would have been abandoned. R. 162-160.
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of the home." R. back of 98. However, it is again likely that any such renters were
merely boarders. Petitioner mentions that Mr. Paulson stated that there were at times up
to four girls living in the basement. R. 138. She indicated that this seems "a little
excessive" to her, but such a situation makes much more sense if viewed in the context of
the "sleeping room" situation discussed above. R. 138. Mr. Paulson stated that there
were cooking facilities in the basement. R. back of 98. However, he does not state what
the cooking facilities were and he insists that his parents did not remodel the house. Id.
Taken in light of Mrs. Shain's statement about there being no kitchen, it is likely
that the cooking facilities mentioned by Mr. Paulson were minimal amenities installed by
the roomers themselves, such as a portable hot plate. This is especially likely given that
Mr. Paulson's knowledge is based only on visits to the home, as he never lived there, and
the correspondence between Mr. Paulson's parents and the Third Owners regarding the
ownership of personal property in the home. When negotiating the sale of the residence
with the Third Owners, the Paulsons refer on several occasions to retaining possession of
the "student furniture" in the basement, but whenever they talk about a kitchen or kitchen
appliances, they refer only to the main floor kitchen. R. 79-back of 76. Whatever
"cooking facilities" the students may have provided themselves, the record shows that the
Paulsons never considered there to be a "kitchen" downstairs.
So viewed in the light most favorable to the Petitioner, evidence regarding the use
of the basement by the first two owners would establish only a right to have boarders, not
a right to have an apartment. However, the Board has no obligation to view the evidence
in such light. Rather the Petitioner has the burden to convince the Board that any
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nonconforming use was not abandoned during this period and the scant evidence
presented could reasonably be viewed as failing to meet that burden.
2.

Substantial evidence was presented that Mrs. Done abandoned
any existing nonconforming use.

Petitioner has raised a number of arguments claiming that a nonconforming use for
a basement apartment existed at least until 1984; either because there was continuous
nonconforming use up to that point or because the City issued a determination of
nonconforming use in 1984. Those arguments have been refuted above. However, even
if one or more of those arguments were accepted, Petitioner's claim still fails. It fails
because the evidence shows that Mrs. Done abandoned any existing nonconforming use.
Pursuant to Provo City Code 14.36.090(1) "any nonconforming structure or use which is
not occupied or used for a continuous period of six (6) months shall be presumed
abandoned and shall not thereafter be re-occupied or used." Abandonment is also
presumed where an owner makes a public statement indicating an intent to abandon the
use. Provo City Code 14.36.090(2). This presumption may be rebutted if the owner
presents evidence showing no intent to abandon the use. Provo City Code 14.36.090(3).
a)

There were several lengthy periods where Mrs. Done did
not rent out the basement.

Several neighbors testified regarding periods during which the Third Owners were
not renting out the basement. Andrew Gustafson, who lives two houses down the street,
testified that Mrs. Done (the Third Owner) was his daughter's best friend and that he had
personal knowledge that there were long periods of time during which she did not have
people living in the basement. R. 125. Lisa Wygant, a next door neighbor since 1993,
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indicated that there were occasional long periods of at least six months during which
there were no renters in the residence. R. 123. She knew there had been no renters
during the last two years of Mrs. Done's life. R. 122. DeAnn Gardner presented herself
as Mrs. Done's friend for 40 years and stated that her backyard bordered on Mrs. Done's.
R. 124. She described two periods of at least six months during which the basement was
not rented out—in 2001 and again in 2003. Id.
Other evidence in the record also reflects periods of non-rental or, at the very least,
a lack of rental history. David Armond stated that several neighbors helped a family
move out of the basement in April 2004 and the basement had not been rented out
between that time and March 2006. R. 75. Petitioner, in a letter addressed to Provo
Mayor Lewis K. Billings, dated May 3, 2006, stated that "no one is sure at this time what
the status has been since April of 2004." R. 70. In a letter dated August 3, 2006,
Petitioner also conceded that "the use of basement apartment has not been well
documented." R. back of 25.
The Board had not only substantial evidence, but undisputed evidence, that there
was at least a period of over a year, from mid-2004 through January 2006, where the
basement was not rented. There is also considerable evidence that this was not the only
period of non-rental creating a presumption of abandonment.
b)

A presumption of abandonment also arises from Mrs.
Done's public statement.

Evidence also indicates that Mrs. Done manifested to others that she did notliave
an intent to preserve the use. Mrs. Gardner related that Mrs. Done asserted in 2001 that
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her apartment was "grandfathered," but she also testified that in 2003 she confirmed with
City staff that a nonconforming use would be deemed abandoned if unused for six
months. R. 124. Mrs. Done's response was, "well, I don't really care whether I lose it or
not, it's nice, I enjoy the privacy of not having anyone there, I don't care, it gives me the
opportunity to let my grandchildren come and stay there if they need a place to stay so it
really doesn't matter to me." R. 124-123.
c)

Petitioner's claim that Mrs. Done had an ongoing intent to
preserve the use during periods of non-use is not
supported by the record.

Petitioner claims that Mrs. Done did not intend to abandon any existing
nonconforming use. Part of this claim centers on an assertion that Mrs. Done only failed
to rent the basement due to ill health prior to her death. However, the record shows that
this assertion, even if accurate during some periods, does not cover sufficient time
periods to negate the presumption of abandonment. Jeanine Gunn, Mrs. Done's daughter,
states that her mother was in ill health for the last year of her life and that this was the
only reason the apartment was vacant. R. back of 75. Mrs. Done died in January of
2006. IcL Even granting her an illness for the entire year of 2005, her illness does not
cover the eight month period of non-use from April 2004 through the end of that year. R.
75. Mr. Armond independently confirms this by stating that Mrs. Done's incapacitation
did not occur until at least six months had passed while the basement was empty. Id.
Further, Petitioner's argument does not cover the periods of non-use in 2001 and 2003
testified to by the neighbors, as discussed above.
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As a small side note, Petitioner has claimed repeatedly that her witnesses are
unbiased and have nothing to gain while the neighborhood witnesses have an axe to
grind. It seems appropriate to note here that Jeanine Gunn does in fact have a motive to
assist Petitioner in getting the rental use of the property approved. If the illegality of the
apartment is upheld, Mrs. Gunn, and perhaps other heirs of Mrs. Done, could quite
possibly become Defendants in a claim by Petitioner that they, or their representatives,
sold her the house without disclosing the nature and extent of the zoning controversy.
In any event, Mrs. Done apparently did make some gesture to rent out the
basement in December 2005, but then backed out. R. back of 75. Given the utter lack of
evidence demonstrating any attempts between April 2004 and December 2005, this is at
best an attempt to reacquire the use (probably based on the hope that it will never be
recognized that it was abandoned) rather than an ongoing effort to avoid abandonment.
Petitioner refers the Court to Caster v. West Valley City, 2001 UT App 220, 29
P.3d 22 regarding the issue of intent to abandon. However, this case only strengthens
Respondents' argument. In Caster, the court held that the property owner had no intent to
abandon his right to a nonconforming use of the property as an auto wreckage and
salvage yard because he had met the statutory requirement to continually maintain the
nonconforming use. Id., at 23. The owner did this by obtaining annual business licenses
for the property and storing vehicles on the property. Id., at 23-24. In the present case,
the Board received no evidence that Mrs. Done attempted to maintain the nonconforming
use other than one attempt to rent the basement nearly two years after the last occupants
moved out.
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II.

THE CITY IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM ENFORCING THE BOARD'S
DECISION AS THIS ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED, ESTOPPEL MAY
NOT BE INVOKED AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL ENTITES, AND THE
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT IT,
A.

Estoppel Was Not Raised Before the Board Either Specifically or to the
"Level of Consciousness" Standard.

Appellant's Brief claims that equitable estoppel is an issue presented in this case.
"[A] party seeking review of agency action must raise an issue before that agency to
preserve the issue for further review." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Company, 966 P.2d
844, 847 (Utah 1998). In the present case, the first mention of the word "estoppel"
occurs well into the District Court proceedings within Petitioner's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 305; R. 303-301. Petitioner failed to raise
estoppel with any particularity even in its Petition for Review to the District Court. R. 63.
However, the Utah Supreme Court has held that in agency decisions the same
level of strict waiver analysis as in a trial court decision may be inappropriate. Badger,
966 P.2d at 847. Therefore, the courts have applied a "level of consciousness" test
"requiring a plaintiff to bring an issue to the fact finder's attention so that there is at least
the possibility that it could be considered." Id.
Appellant's Brief (at page 6) cites several portions of the record to assert that this
issue was raised in the hearing before the Board. We here review those citations.
Petitioner first claims estoppel was raised at R. 182:139 to 181:140-147. This refers to a
portion of Petitioner's testimony before the Board. In this section, Petitioner refers to the
Case File document (R. 74) and states "[a]s far as we're concerned this letter that says
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"conformed nonconforming back in 1983 was the last that was ever said on it from the
City and we read that to say that it was definitely nonconforming at that time." R. 181:
144-146. This sentence refers in the present tense to Petitioner's view of the document at
the time of the hearing. It does so in the context of arguing that the Board should find a
nonconforming use now because there was, allegedly, a finding of nonconforming use in
1983 and the relevant owner then, allegedly, had renters continuously until 2004.
Nowhere in this section does Petitioner say that she had that understanding of the
document prior to purchasing the house, that she relied upon it in her decision to buy the
house, or even that she definitely had the document before buying the house.
Petitioner next claims the issue was raised at R. 186:44-46. The only apparently
relevant text here is: "And one of the great things about the home was the basement
apartment, that it looked like, from all the evidence we had heard, it had been used for
students and should be able to be used for that in the future." Nothing in the phrase
indicates specific knowledge of the case file document and any action on the part of the
City. It only vaguely infers that Petitioner relied upon her own research of the issue.
Petitioner then cites R. 167:449-454 in her support. In this testimony, Petitioner's
father asserted to the Board that:
indeed we had a conversation with the realtor at the time that the home was
purchased. Alicia asked a lot of questions, Alicia looked in the city's files
as a matter of fact, found the conformed and nonconforming letter. Alicia
in fact knew that there would be controversy, knew that there would be
opposition, I think the realtor was very clear on that. The realtor did at no
time state that in his opinion the basement apartment was not legally
nonconforming, in fact it was our conclusion after looking at what we had
for evidence that it was.
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Here again there is no clear mention of detrimental reliance of City action. The case file
document is again mentioned but only in the general context of having been seen by
Petitioner during her research. No assertion is made that this is the document she relied
on in purchasing her home. It is not even clear from the statement when exactly the
research was done, only that it was "at the time the home was purchased." Id
Finally, Petitioner relies on R. back of 276:2-5, which states: "In this case, it is '
clear that the concept of a nonconforming use was inserted in the ordinance to avoid
unnecessary, unwarranted, and unfair treatment of those who have acquired property in
reliance upon its historical use and qualification in the absence of notice to the contrary."
This citation does at least contain the word "reliance." However, it is in the context of
relying on how past owners of the land have used it. The paragraph then goes on to
summarize the standard of substantial evidence. R. back of 276. This argument follows
a discussion of the case file document, but only in the context that the Board should find
a current nonconforming use based on the argument that such a determination had
previously been made when Mrs. Done was the owner.
A review of the entire record presented to the Board makes clear that Petitioner's
discussion of the case file document was only ever as part of an overarching argument
that the evidence as a whole supported that Mrs. Done had possessed a right to a
nonconforming use. To the extent that the record ever even infers that Petitioner "relied"
upon something in purchasing the home, it is only the general categories of the research
she did or the evidence she viewed as a whole that she might be perceived to be relying
upon. The Board members5 reaction clearly illustrates this, as the only person the
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members viewed as having a possible claim to rely on the case file document was Mrs.
Done. R. 162:543-550; R. 161:580-162:584.
Petitioner's father wrote a letter to the Community Development Staff Coordinator
shortly before the Board hearing laying out his understanding of the issues. Estoppel, or
even an allusion to it, appears nowhere in it. R. 103 and back. Finally, while this was not
before the Board, Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment before Judge Howard is interesting in trying to determine how to interpret
Petitioner's claim of issue preservation. In that Memorandum, dated February 28, 2007,
Petitioner states:
Before closing on the house, Petitioner reviewed many documents,
and came away with the distinct understanding that she would be able to
rent the lower portion of the house because it was a legal non-conforming
use. While Petitioner does not remember the specific document that caused
this understanding, it likely was the City's case file document in question.
Regardless, Petitioner relied upon the representations of the previous
owners who said they had rented out the apartment and who understood
that they had a legal nonconforming basement apartment. R. 301
(emphasis added).
This statement completely undercuts Petitioner's entire estoppel argument, at least
against the City. Petitioner then attempts to resurrect the argument by rather
tenuously asserting that the previous owners probably relied on the case file
document, so perhaps Petitioner's reliance on the previous owners would be kind
of like relying on the City. At a minimum this argument fails because there is no
evidence the previous owners ever saw the case file document.

3

Note this in reference to the potential bias of Jeanine Gunn mentioned at I.C.(2)(c),
supra.
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As indicated above, Petitioner did eventually raise the issue of estoppel at
the District Court. R. 341-340. The District Court mentioned that the argument
had been raised in its ruling, but did not specifically rule on it. This may have
been either because of the Court's finding that the case file document did not mean
what Petitioner claimed and therefore could not have been reasonably relied upon
or because the Court recognized that the issue was not properly before it. In any
event, Petitioner raised the issue much too late and the District Court's failure to
address it is irrelevant as the issue was not properly before it.
In short, Petitioner may have concluded that the residence has a
nonconforming apartment before she bought it, but she never raised facts or
arguments before the Board that would allow it to become conscious of or
consider an argument that she specifically relied to her detriment on a City action.
Thus, the estoppel issue is not properly preserved for review by this Court.
B.

Petitioner May Not Invoke Estoppel Against a Governmental Entity.

Even if Petitioner's vague references to the case file document constitute an
argument of detrimental reliance upon it, Petitioner's claim of equitable estoppel is
barred as a matter of law as it may not be invoked against a governmental entity. Terry.
157 P.3d at 365 (citing Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah
1992). There is a limited exception to this rule if "the facts may be found with such
certainty, and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception."
Utah State Univ. of Agric. & Applied Sci. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 720 (Utah
1982). Petitioner's own cited estoppel case is a prime example where this Court rejected
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an argument of estoppel despite the fact that prior to enforcing a zoning ordinance against
the Defendant, the town of Alta had affirmatively granted Defendant three business
licenses for a total of twenty-four months. Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d
797. 802 (Utah App. 1992). To claim estoppel against Respondents for a zoning law
decision, Petitioner must show that the "circumstances are exceptional." Id., at 803.
1.

Estoppel does not arise because there was no clear and definitive
act by the city with respect to the Petitioner.

Petitioner asserts that the City performed a clear and definitive act, which the
Petitioner then relied on to her detriment, but it very unclear what that act was. Petitioner
treats the case file document as if it were a formal memo issued by the City to all persons
interested in knowing about the legal uses of 1295 Cedar Ave. In fact, the document is a
two paragraph, twenty-three-year-old, internal memo that makes no affirmation as to the
property in question except that the document ends with two printed words that make
little, if any, sense when taken together. There is no evidence that the City ever provided
this document to Mrs. Done or her family when she owned the property. The document
was certainly not issued to Petitioner as a declaratory statement. It's not even clear from
the record how, or when, Petitioner got the document. (The Provo City's Community
Development Department Request for Records Log for 2006 show requests for records
by Alicia Vial on July 3, 2006 and August 9, 2006, but nothing before that. See
Addendum, Exhibit B) Petitioner never claims to have told City personnel that she was
considering purchasing the property. In fact, as discussed below, Petitioner claims to
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have done everything possible to understand the status of the property, except the one
thing she reasonably should have done—ask the governing body!
As discussed in detail in I.B.(3), supra, the document itself is not clear. Even if it
were, it is hard to understand how to construe that the City engaged in a clear and
definitive act when Petitioner obtained on her own a document not addressed to, or
intended for, her without any knowledge on the City's part why she even wanted it. This
clearly does not constitute exceptional circumstances or facts that can be found with
sufficient certainty to overcome the bar to raising estoppel in this case. For that matter, it
doesn't even meet the necessary elements of estoppel if the claim were not barred.
2.

Estoppel does not arise because the Petitioner did not reasonably
rely upon an act by the City,

As discussed at length in II.A., supraJ there is no indication in the record before
the Board that Petitioner actually relied upon the case file document in reaching her
decision to purchase this property. We note here that where Appellant's Brief quotes the
record in support of Petitioner's reliance (page 12), Petitioner changes the tense of the
sentence from present to past to bolster their reliance argument contrary to the contents of
the record. SeeR. 182:139 to 181:140-147. In short, Petitioner's claim that she bought
this property in reliance upon a two-word statement in an old City case file arose only
several months after both the purchase of the house and the Board's determination of her
appeal. Petitioner has admitted that she was advised by the realtor that there was
controversy surrounding the use of the property and that she had a responsibility to
comply with and investigate the governing zoning laws. R. 120; R. 65. Her response to
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that information was to gather evidence of past use from prior owners and not to request
an opinion from Provo City. She may have run across the case file document prior to
purchasing the house and decided that it strengthened her case. However, taken together
her actions indicate that not only did she not rely on the City's input in buying the house,,
but intentionally avoided it.
The following facts are illustrative of this conclusion. Petitioner closed on the
house on April 21, 2006. R. 186. On April 26, 2006 she received notice of the City's
Zone Verification. R. back of 71. This Verification was not requested by her and she
states that she was unaware that it had even been requested prior to April 26, 2006. Id.
Yet when she later contested the Zone Verification, she provided City staff with a
statement from the previous owner's daughter on April 24, 2006. R. back of 67. If she
had reviewed the City's case file document prior to purchase and determined prior to
purchase that the City would definitely recognize the nonconforming use of the property
and decided to go ahead with the purchase in reliance on that determination, then why
was she collecting letters regarding the use of the basement three days after she bought
the house, but two days before she knew anything about the Zone Verification? If she
was sufficiently concerned to continue investigating, why didn't she approach the City
for an opinion?
Nevertheless, even if Petitioner did make her decision based on the case file
document, that reliance was unreasonable for a multitude of reasons. Many have been
raised above, such as a mass of evidence showing that Petitioner knew the renting of the
apartment was controversial, but we mention one final one here. The document in
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question was twenty-two-years-old when Petitioner purchased the house. How, by any
sense of the word, would it be reasonable to rely on a two word notation in a twenty-twoyear-old file when making such an important decision? Especially when the file itself
indicates that the question is one of frequent controversy?
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing facts and arguments, Appellees, Provo City and the Provo
City Board of Adjustment, respectfully request that this Court uphold the decision of the
Board of Adjustment and deny Petitioner's claim for a nonconforming use related to the
property located at 1295 Cedar Ave, Provo, Utah.

DATED this 15th day of February, 2008.

XBRIANJONp^
Attorney for Appellees
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT A
Provo City Code, Chapter 14.36 Nonconforming Uses, Structures and Lots.

ZONING
(5) A fee as shown on the Consolidated Fee Schedule adopted
by the Municipal Council shall be required for each event at a specific
location, and three hundred (300) dollar bond shall be posted for each
event and each location.
(6) Liability insurance in the amount of $1,000,000 for personal
injury, $3,000,000 per event showing Provo City as an additional
insured shall be required.
(7) A hold harmless and indemnity agreement shall be signed by
the permit holder.
(8) Special events may be held in an agricultural zone subject to
specific site approval.
(9) A special event permit may be canceled if it is determined by
staff that the use is detrimental to the health, safety and welfare of the
community at the location specified on the permit.
(Enacted 1992-40, Am 2006-15, Am 2007-11)

Chapter 14,36 Nonconforming Uses, Structures,
and Lots.
14.36.010. Purpose.
14.36.020. Scope.
14.36.030. Change in Nonconforming Status.
14.36.040. Nonconforming Uses.
14.36.050. Nonconforming Structures.
14.36.060. Nonconforming Lots.
14.36.070. Other Nonconformities.
14.36.080. Nonconformities Resulting From Public Action.
14.36.090. Abandonment of Nonconforming Structure or Use.
14.36.100. Determination of Nonconforming Status-Effect of
Determination.
14.36.110. Residential Structures Originally Constructed as a Onefamily Dwelling - Status Determination.
14.36.120. Apartment Dwellings - Status Determination.
14.36.140. Billboards Exempt.
14.36.150. Appeals.
14.36.010. Purpose.
The purpose of this Chapter is to establish regulations governing
legally established lots, structures, uses and other nonconformities
that do not conform to applicable requirements of this Title. They may
continue to exist and be put to productive use, but their nonconforming
aspects shall be regulated as provided in this Chapter. The intent of
this Chapter is to recognize the interests of property owners while
controlling expansion of nonconforming conditions. (Rep&ReEn 200205)
14.36.020. Scope.
The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to all lots, structures,
uses and other nonconformities within the City regardless of when
the nonconformity was established. Any lot, structure, use or other
circumstance governed by this Title which does not conform to the
provisions of this Title may be continued to the extent that it was
legally established and complies with applicable provisions of this
Chapter. (Rep&ReEn 2002-05)
14.36.030. Change in Nonconforming Status.
A nonconforming lot, structure, use or other nonconformity may
not be changed except in conformance with the provisions of this
Title. Whenever any nonconforming use is changed to a less intensive
nonconforming use, such use shall not be changed back to a more
intensive nonconforming use. Whenever any nonconforming use is
changed to a conforming use, such use shall not later be changed to a
nonconforming use. (Rep&ReEn 2002-05)
14.36.040. Nonconforming Uses.
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(1) Continuation. A nonconforming use which was legally
existing when such use became prohibited may be continued as
provided in this section and by any other applicable provision of this
Chapter, so long as it remains otherwise lawful, subject to applicable
standards and limitations in this Chapter.
(2) Expansion Within Conforming Building. A nonconforming
use existing within a portion of a conforming building may not be
expanded.
(3) Expanding and Altering Nonconforming Uses of Land and
Structures. No nonconforming use may be moved, enlarged or altered
and no nonconforming use of land may occupy additional land, except
as provided in this Section.
(a) A nonconforming use may not be enlarged, expanded or
extended to occupy all or a part of another structure or site, that
it did not occupy on January 1, 2002.
(b) A structure containing a nonconforming use may not be moved unless the use shall thereafter conform to the regulations
of the zoning district into which the structure is moved. Prior to
moving any building, the applicant shall make application, and
go through the process set forth in Chapter 14.40, Provo City
Code.
(4) Nonconforming Use of Open Land. A nonconforming use of
open land may be continued provided such nonconforming use shall
not be expanded or extended into any building or open land, except
as may be required by law.
(5) Expamsion of Outdoor Nonconforming Uses. A
nonconforming use of a lot where the principal use is not enclosed
within a building, such as a salvage yard or a motor vehicle sales lot,
shall not be expanded except in conformity with the requirements of
this Title.
(6) Restoration. A nonconforming use in a conforming structure
damaged by fire, wind, tornado, earthquake, or other natural disaster
or calamity may be restored as it existed previously and its use may
be continued so long as restoration is complete within one (1) year.
(Rep&ReEn 2002-05, Am 2003-43)
14.36.050. Nonconforming Structures.
(1) Continuation. A nonconforming structure in any zone may
be continued as provided in this Section and any other applicable
provision of this Chapter so long as no additions or enlargements are
made thereto and no structural alterations are made therein, except
as provided in this Section or as may be required by law. If any
nonconforming structure is removed from the lot where it was located
each future structure thereon shall conform to applicable provisions
of this Title.
(2) Maintenance and Repair. A nonconforming structure may
be maintained. Repairs and structural alterations may be made to
a nonconforming structure within the existing footprint thereof
provided that trie degree of nonconformity is not increased.
(3) Expansion and Enlargement. Any expansion of a
nonconforming structure that increases the degree of nonconformance
is prohibited except as provided in this Subsection or as may
be required by law. An existing one-family dwelling which is
nonconforming as to height, area, or yard regulations may be added to
or enlarged if the addition or enlargement conforms with applicable
requirements of this Title. Provided, however, that such a dwelling
which is nonconforming as to side yard requirements but having a
minimum side yard of not less than three (3) feet, may be extended
along the nonconforming building line to the extent of one-half
(Vi) the length of the existing dwelling if such extension is for the
purpose of enlarging and maintaining the existing dwelling unit in
the structure, and provided such enlargement conforms to ail other
regulations of the zone in which the dwelling is located.
(4) Relocation. If a nonconforming structure is relocated within
the City, it shall be located in a manner which fully conforms with
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applicable requirements of this Title, including the procedures set
forth in Chapter 14.40, Provo City Code.
(5) Restoration. A nonconforming structure damaged by fire,
wind, tornado, earthquake, or other natural disaster or calamity may
be restored as it existed previously and its use may be continued so
long as restoration is complete within one (1) year. (Rep&ReEn 200205)
14.36.060. Nonconforming Lots.
(1) Continuation. A nonconforming lot may continue to be
occupied and used although it may not conform in every respect with
the dimensional requirements of this Title, subject to the provisions
of this Section and any other applicable provision of this Chapter.
(2) Residential Zones. A new dwelling may be constructed on
a legally established lot which is nonconforming as to area, frontage
and/or width provided the dwelling conforms to all other requirements
of this Title and other applicable codes.
(3) Nonresidential Zones. A new building may be constructed on
a legally established lot which is nonconforming as to area, frontage
and/or width provided the building conforms to all other requirements
of this Title and other applicable codes.
(4) Lot with Existing Building or Structure. If a nonconforming
lot contains a legally established structure the owner may continue
the legal use of such structure and may expand the structure so long
as the expansion conforms to applicable requirements of this Title.
(5) Accessory Buildings. Accessory buildings customarily
incidental to a main building or structure may be constructed on a
nonconforming lot provided the accessory building and its location on
the lot meets all other applicable building and zoning requirements.
(Rep&ReEn 2002-05)
14.36.070. Other Nonconformities.
(1) Application and Intent. This Section shall apply to any
other circumstance which does not conform to the requirements of
this Title including, but not limited to, fence height or location; lack
of buffers or screening; lack of or inadequate landscaping; lack of
or inadequate off-street parking; and any other nonconformity not
covered by Sections 14.36.040, 14.36.050, and 14.36.060 of this
Chapter. Because the nonconformities regulated by this Section
involve less investment and are more easily corrected than those
regulated by Sections 14.36.030, 14.36.040, and 14.36.050 of this
Chapter, the intent of the City is to eliminate such nonconformities as
quickly as practicable. The degree of such nonconformities shall not
be increased.
(2) Nonconforming Development with Approved Site Plan. Any
nonconforming development which is governed by an approved site
plan shall be deemed to be in conformance with this Title to the extent
such development conforms to the plan.
(3) Compliance Required. Except as provided in Subsection (4),
a nonconformity other than one enumerated in Sections 14.36.040,
14.36.050, and 14.36.060 of this Chapter shall be brought into
conformance upon the occurrence of any one of the following:
(a) Any action which increases the floor area of the premises
by more than thirty percent (30%).
(b) Any action which, when combined with one (1) or more
previous expansions that have occurred over a period of time,
causes the aggregate area of expansion to exceed thirty percent
(30%) of the original floor area of the premises.
(c) For a lot located in a commercial or industrial zone, any
change in use to a more intensive use when a new certificate of
occupancy is required.
(4) This Section shall not apply to property located in the CBD
zone. (Rep&ReEn 2002-05, Am 2003-43)
14.36.080. Nonconformities Resulting From Public Action.

When area or yard setbacks of a legally established lot are
reduced as the result of conveying land to a federal, state or local
government for a public purpose, such lot and yards shall be deemed
to be in compliance with the minimum lot size and yard setback
standards of this Title without any need for a variance. (Rep&ReEn
2002-05)
14.36.090. Abandonment of Nonconforming Structure or Use.
(1) Presumption of Abandonment by Passage of Time. Any
nonconforming structure or use which is not occupied or used for
a continuous period of six (6) months shall be presumed abandoned
and shall not thereafter be re-occupied or used except in a manner
that conforms to the requirements of this Title unless the presumption
of abandonment is overcome as provided in Subsection (3) of this
Section.
(2) Presumption of Abandonment by Event. Independent of the
six (6) month requirement set forth in Subsection (1) of this Section,
a nonconforming structure or use shall be presumed abandoned when
any of the following events occur:
(a) The owner has in writing or by public statement indicated
intent to abandon the structure, use or other nonconformity
(b) A less intensive use has replaced the original
nonconforming use;
(c) The owner has physically changed the structure or its
permanent equipment in a way that reduces or eliminates the
nonconformity; or
(d) The structure has been removed through applicable
procedures for the abatement or condemnation of unsafe
structures.
(3) Overcoming Presumption ofAbandonment. A presumption of
abandonment may be rebutted upon evidence presented by the owner
showing no intent to abandon the structure or use. Such evidence
may include proof that during the alleged period of abandonment the
owner has done either of the following:
(a) Maintained the structure or use, if any, in accordance
with the applicable codes; or
(b) Has actively and continuously attempted to sell or lease
the property where the structure or use is located. (Rep&ReEn
2002-05)
14.36.100. Determination of Nonconforming Status - Effect of
Determination.
(1) Procedure. The Zoning Administrator, or the Administrator's
designee, shall determine the existence, expansion, or modification
of a nonconforming lot, structure, use or other nonconformity as
provided in the following procedure:
(a) If a determination of the nonconforming status of
a property is desired, the owner or his designee shall make
application for a Zone Verification with the Department of
Community Development. The Zoning Administrator shall then
investigate the factual and legal history of the subject property
and shall thereafter make a determination of nonconforming
status of the property.
(b) Notice of the determination of nonconforming status
shall be mailed to the owners of the subject property, and to the
chair of the neighborhood where the property is located.
(c) If within ten (10) days after notice is mailed, information
is received by the Zoning Administrator which may affect the
validity of the determination, the Administrator may make an
amended determination. Notice of an amended determination
shall be given as set forth in Subsection (b) of this Section.
(d) The notice shall include a statement that any
determination may be appealed to the Board of Adjustment as
provided in Chapter 14.05 of this Title and shall state the date by
which the appeal must be filed.
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(2) Burden of Proof. In all cases, the property owner shall
have the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that a
lot, structure, use or other circumstance which does not conform
to the provisions of this Title complied with applicable ordinance
requirements in effect when the nonconforming circumstance was
established.
(a) A preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more
credible and convincing than evidence offered in opposition to
it.
(b) Evidence offered to prove a lot, structure, use, or other
circumstance was legally established may include, but is not
limited to:
(i) The date when the circumstance was created;
(ii) Copies of applicable zoning, building, or other
code provisions in effect at the time of creation;
(iii) Documents showing the nonconforming
circumstance was authorized such as building permits,
letters, and meeting minutes of governmental bodies where
the circumstance was discussed and/or authorized;
(iv) Property inspection reports which indicate the
degree that the nonconforming circumstance complies with
applicable codes in effect at the time of creation; and
(v) Affidavits of persons with personal knowledge of
the circumstances of creation.
(c) If no provision of a previously applicable zoning
ordinance would have allowed a claimed nonconforming
circumstance, it shall be prima facie evidence that it was not
legally established.
(d) If when established, a lot, structure, use or other
circumstance did not conform to the provisions of applicable
zoning or other code provisions, the fact that it has been
occupied, used, or existed for a considerable period of time shall
not be a factor in determining whether the circumstance should
be deemed legally established.
(3) Abatement or Compliance. If a property owner is unable
to demonstrate that a lot, structure, use or other nonconforming
circumstance was legally established, it shall be deemed illegal and
shall be abated or brought into conformance with applicable provisions
of this Title. Abatement or compliance shall be achieved within thirty
(30) days, unless the work which must be undertaken to achieve
compliance cannot be accomplished in that time period. In such case
the owner of the property shall enter into a legally binding agreement
wherein the owner agrees to a schedule to achieve conformity as soon
as reasonably practicable, so long as compliance is achieved within
six (6) months. (Rep&ReEn 2002-05, Am 2002-32)
14.36.110. Residential Structures Originally Constructed as a
One-family Dwelling - Status Determination.
(1) Purpose. In addition to other applicable provisions of this
Chapter, the provisions of this Section shall be applied to determine
whether a residential structure originally constructed as a one-family
dwelling, but not presently occupied as such, should be deemed a
nonconforming structure or use, or both.
(2) Building Permit Record. If necessary building permits were
issued authorizing one (1) or more units in the dwelling in addition to
the original dwelling unit and construction was substantially completed
pursuant to such permits, the issuance of such permits shall be prima
facie evidence that the structure and use are nonconforming.
(3) No Building Permit Record. If no building permits exist, a
determination of nonconformity shall be made pursuant to Subsections
(a) and (b) below.
(a) A determination shall be made as to whether a dwelling
unit substantially conforms to applicable zoning and building
code requirements in effect when the additional dwelling unit
was established, particularly those requirements set forth in
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Section 14.36.130 of this Chapter. Such determination shall
include a physical inspection of the premises by the Chief
Building Official or his designee.
(i) If substantial conformance with applicable codes is
found, the nonconforming circumstance shall be deemed
legally established.
(ii) If substantial conformance is not found, the illegal
aspects of the structure and use shall be abated or brought
into compliance with applicable zoning and building code
requirements in effect when the additional dwelling unit
was established, except as provided in Section 14.36.130
of this Chapter.
(b) The presence of an interior connection between upper,
lower, or adjoining portions of a structure originally constructed
as a one-family dwelling shall create a presumption that only one
dwelling unit was originally authorized, unless the connection was obviously originally constructed as a vestibule, lobby,
or passage way between dwelling units in the structure. Any
evidence that the dwelling units were legally created, including
but not limited to information listed in Section 14.36.100(2)(b)
of this Chapter, shall be submitted to the Zoning Administrator
to aid in making this determination. (Rep&ReEn 2002-05)
14.36.120. Multiple-Family Dwellings and Apartment Complexes
Constructed Prior to 1974 - Status Determination.
(1) A project consisting of one or more multiple-family dwellings
or apartment buildings constructed prior to January 1, 1974, which is
located in a zone where the apartments, as presently existing, are not
permitted shall be deemed nonconforming so long as the apartments
in the complex:
(a) Were originally constructed substantially as presently
existing;
(b) Were not originally constructed and occupied as onefamily dwellings and later converted to multiple-family or
apartment dwellings.
(c) Are all owned by the same individual, association, firm,
partnership, or other legal entity; and
(d) Are managed by a property manager, or management
company in Provo City.
(2) The owner of an apartment complex which meets the
requirements of Subsection (1) may request a zoning verification from
the Community Development Department If after due investigation,
the Department determines by a preponderance of evidence that
the building conforms to the requirements of Subsection (1), the
name, address and a statement of the characteristics of the apartment
building shall be added to an official list of such apartment complexes
maintained by the Community Development Department. Upon
determining that an apartment complex should be added to the list,
the Department shall send a letter to the owner of the complex and
the chair of neighborhood where the building is located stating the
Department's findings and decision. During regular business hours
the list shall be made available to the public upon request. (Rep&ReEn
2002-05)
14.36.130. Termination of Nonconforming Uses.
(1) An illegal nonconforming use shall be terminated immediately
without regard to this Section.
(2) This Section shall apply to any present or future legal
nonconforming use located in the Wasatch Neighborhood regardless
of how created and includes, but is not limited to, a nonconforming
use created by City legislative or administrative action, a Board of
Adjustment decision, a judicial decision, settlement of a zoning
enforcement matter, an agreement with Provo City, an error by the
City, and any previously existing provision of this Title.
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(3) Pursuant to the provisions of this Section any nonconforming
use located in the Wasatch Neighborhood, described in Subsection (8)
of this Section, shall be terminated:
(a) by January 2, 2010, if such use was legally existing
prior to January 2, 2007, or
(b) within three (3) years after the date when such use
became legally nonconforming, if legally created on or after
January 2, 2007.
(c) January 2, 2007 shall be the termination start date for a
legal, nonconforming use in existence prior to January 2, 2007.
The termination start date for any nonconforming use created
on or after January 2, 2007 is the date when such use became
legally nonconforming.
(4) The Community Development Director or the Director's
designee shall grant an owner of property affected by Subsection
14.36.130(3) an extension of the time required to conform with such
section if:
(a) the owner:
(i) by six (6) months after the termination start date
files a notice of intent to apply for a time extension as
provided in this Section; and
(ii) by one (1) year after the termination start date files
a complete application for an extension of time as provided
in this Section, and
(b) the owner"s application for an extension of time
demonstrates by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i) the nonconforming use which is the subject of the
application was legally established; and
(ii) subject to the formula in Subsection (5) of this
Section, the owner is unable to recover prior to three (3)
years after the termination start date the amount of the
owner's investment in the property.
(5) (a) The time period during which an owner may recover
the amount of investment in property affected by Section
14.36.130(3) of this Section shall be determined by dividing the
residual value of the property by the average monthly net rental
income from the property. The resulting figure is the number of
months which the owner shall have to recover the investment in
the property.
(b) For the purposes of this Subsection the following
definitions shall apply:
(i) "Amount of the owner's investment" means the
adjusted present value of a property as of the termination
start date.
(ii) "Adjusted present value" means a property's
original purchase price plus any capital improvements and
less depreciation and net income from the property, all as
adjusted for inflation to the termination start date.
(iii) "Compliance value" means the appraised value
of the property on the termination start date assuming the
nonconforming use is terminated.
(iv) "Residual value" means the difference between a
property's adjusted present value and its compliance value
as of the termination start date.
(c) The time period determined under Subsection (5)(a)
of this Section shall apply to the property for which the owner
made an application for an extension of time and to the owner's
successors, if any, until such time period has run.
(6) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Community
Development Director or the Director's designee applying this Section
may appeal such decision to the Board of Adjustment as provided in
Chapter 14.05 of this Title.
(7) The Community Development Director may adopt reasonable
regulations to carry out the purpose of this Section.

(8) The boundary of the Wasatch Neighborhood is shown on
the Official Neighborhood Map adopted by the Municipal Council
pursuant to Section 2.29.010(1), Provo City Code, and is described
as follows: commencing at 1900 North and 1200 East; thence east
on 1900 North to Oak Lane; thence east on Oak Lane to 1400 East;
thence south on 1400 East to 820 North; thence west on 820 North
to 1350 East; thence northwest from 1350 East (connecting to Birch
Lane) to 900 East; thence north on 900 East to just north of Fir Circle
(1500 North), thence northwest from 1500 North (connecting to Fir
Ave.) to approximately 1200 East and 1700 North; thence north from
the intersection of 1200 East and 1700 North to approximately 1900
North and 1200 East. (Enacted 2007-01)
14.36.140. Billboards Exempt.
The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to billboards.
Nonconforming billboards shall be terminated in accordance with
applicable provisions of Section 10-9-407 and 10-9-408, Utah Code
Annotated. In the event such provisions are repealed, nonconforming
billboards shall be subject to the provisions of this Chapter. (Rep&ReEn
2002-05)
14.36.150. Appeals.
Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Zoning Administrator
or other official enforcing the provisions of this Chapter may appeal
for relief therefrom to the Board of Adjustment as provided in this
Title. Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Board of Adjustment
enforcing the provisions of this Chapter may appeal to the District
Court as provided in Section 14.05.050 of this Title. (Rep&ReEn 200205)

Chapter 14.37, Off-Street Parking Standards,
14.37.010.
14.37.020.
14.37.030.
14.37.040.
14.37.050.
14.37.060.
14.37.070.
14.37.080.
14.37.090.
14.37.100.
14.37.110.
14.37.120.

Off-Street Parking.
Permanent Parking to be Provided.
Continuing Obligation.
Nonconforming Facilities.
Reduction in Parking Requirements.
Parking Spaces Required.
Parking Requirements for Uses Not Specified.
General Provisions.
Required Improvements and Maintenance.
Parking Design Standards.
Handicapped Parking Spaces.
Notice of Parking and Occupancy Restrictions.

14.37.010. Off-Street Parking.
The number of off-street parking spaces required in connection
with any particular land use shall be not less than that set forth in this
Chapter, except for permitted reductions allowed under the provisions
of Section 14.37.070, Provo City Code.
14.37.020. Permanent Parking to be Provided.
Every building structure, improvement, or use hereafter
constructed, reconstructed, or enlarged, shall be provided with
permanently maintained parking spaces as specified in this Chapter
for the area of said construction, reconstruction, or enlargement. (Am
1995-22)
14.37.030. Continuing Obligation.
The required off-street parking facilities shall be a continuing
obligation of the property owner so long as the use requiring vehicle
parking or vehicle loading facilities continues. It shall be unlawful
for any owner of any building or use to discontinue or dispense with

EXHIBIT B
Provo City Community Development Department,
Request for Records Log for 2006

REQUEST FOR RECORDS LOG FOR 2006
1 N/C

Peter Wisnom

| 535 No. 400 E. & 660 No. 200 E.

1/11/06

Jerome Gourley

CUP staff requirements for AT&T site
J @ 1330 East 300 North/Seven Peaks

1/11/06

Wilmer
Desposorio

756 East Walnut Street

MarkB.

1/11/06

N/C

1/12/06

Wilmer
Desposrio

2440 N. 750 East

B.Taylor

1/11/06

N/C

I 1/19/06

Kyle Woodbury

333 West 1300 North

Pierre D.

11/18/06

N/C 1

J 1/6/06

Ian Wright

1130 East Ridge Road

Julie S.

2/06/06

5.00 1

1 1/30/06

H.Todd

946 Cedar

B.Taylor

2/07/06

N/C 1

2/01/06

Wilmer
Despasorio

2431 North 750 East

C.Potter

2/21/06

5.00

2/01/06

Wilmer
Desposorio

745 East 2320 North

C.Potter

2/21/06

5.00

1 2/01/06

Lacinda Lewis

368 East 200 North

M.Taylor

| 2/01/06

Steve Clark

1141 West 650 North

Brian L.

1 2/02/06

Gwen Taylor

258 North 700 East

Reta T.

2/02/06

2/06/06

Will
Christensen

2043 South Mountain Vista Ln.

B.Taylor

2/22/06

2/8/06

Kelly Nielson

428 West 4150 North

B.Taylor

2/14/06

2/8/06

Monte
MacGilliveray

1366 East 1120 South

B.taylor;
Skip
Tandy

plans never
picked up.

125.00

B.Taylor

B.Taylor

12.00 |

| 1/06/06

2/13/06 1 Vickie Case

3751 No. Timpview Drive

J Carrie W. J 1/10/06
Cory B.

2/02/06

2/13/06

| Jacob Menke

710-716 North 490 West

| J.Stout

2/16/06

2/9/06

J Jason Knapp

158 South 400 East

| J.Stout

J 2/13/06

N/C 1
N/C 1
no
plans
found
no
plans
found

1 6.20 1
1 6.00

J

2/09/06

Charles
Thomas

364 East 200 South

B.Taylor

2/13/06

Mitch
McAllister

383 North 400 East

M.Boekel

2/13/06

Matthew
Velasquez

350 East 400 North

2/21/06

E.J.Kotalik Jr.

300 North 1450 East

B.Taylor/
M.Lopez

2/22/06

Bill & Carolyn
Nelson

519/521 East 200 South

B.Taylor

2/22/06

Valene Taylor

qqwetru[\][poyue487 South 1330
West /request cancelled by applicant

B.Taylor

2/23/06

cancel

1 2/22/06

Randall Smith

383 North 400 West

C.Potter

3/03/06

11.20 1

2/28/06

Steve Riider

200 West 2280 North

M.Taylor

mailed
3/06/06

46.40

1 2/28/06

Chris Opfar

301 & 303 East 500 North

J.Stout

2/28/06

N/C 1

I 3/01/06

John Wallace

343 West 1300 North

J.Stout

3/1/06

.90

| 3/-1/-6

Kevin O'Reilly

1573 East 900 South

B.Latta

3/01/06

10.00 1

1 3/01/06

Curtis Frei

531 South 300 West

J.Stout

3/01/06

.90 1

1 3/7/06

Peggy Brudette

856 South 500 West

K.Saluone

4/12/06

10.00 1

1 3/13/06

Jared Rowley

450 east 300 North

Julie S.

3/13/06

1.00 1

1 3/09/06

Jim Stevens

188 West 3300 North

B.Taylor

3/14/06

N/C

1 3/14/06

Lisa Clark

3218 North Cottonwood Lane

B.Taylor

12/14/06

cancel

3/15/06

Lori Kennard

628/630 ; 632/638 East 700 North

M.Boekel

3/15/06

N/C 1

3/21/06

RVC
Constuction

Liberty Square / 556 North 400 East

B.Taylor

12/14/06

no
plans

3/22/06

Peter Van
Orman

670 East 350 North

Brian L.

4/11/06

21.00

3/22/06

Ernest
Muirhead

659 North 300 East

3/22/06 1 Mark Nugent

2/13/06

C.
| Walls

no
plans
found
5.00

2/13/06

N/C

No Plans

N/C

12/14/06

cancel

|

|

Chelsea

W.
414 North 600 East

2/22/06

| B.Lattta

J
| 3/22/06

J 1.00 1

3/23/06

1 3/27/06

Howard Bandt
J Clayton Wolf

1543 West 1825 North

B,.Taylor

3077 Bannock Drive

B.Taylor

No plans
found

1 4/6/06

N/C

J 12.00

3/27/06

Gary Patel

1460 South University Ave.

B.Taylor

no plans
found

N/C

3/28/06

James Wiltbank
Ivory Homes

1233 West 1950 North / Lot 56

B.Taylor

2/29/06

100.00

3/28/06

Gary Peterson

4191 Imperial Way

B.Taylor

no plans
found

N/C

3/30/06

Craig C.
Cheney

2348 Cambridge Circle

1 3/30/06

Sara Olsen

199 South 1000 East

Julie S.

3/30/30

.10

1 4/03/06

Candace Laib

audio recording PC commission mtg.

Karen S.

4/03/06

10.00 1

J 4/04/06

Scott Stone

854 East 350 North

Mark B.

4/04/06

N/C

1 4/5/06

Heidi Toth

86 North University Avenue

B.Taylor

12/14/06

cancel

1 4/10/06

Kathi Izatt

The Down Condominiums

Mboeckel

4/10/06

18.70 1

4/12/06

Mike Watson

1366 East 1120 South

B.Taylor

sent to
engineer

N/C

4/12/06

Joseph D.
Kader

324 East 300 South

Julie S.

4/12/06

.70

4/18/06

Hans Boshard

825 North 750 West / Accessory
Dwelling Permit

B.Latta

4/18/06

.25

4/18/06

Keith Finlayson

Zoning records for these properties
1334 N. 900 E., 354/356 S. 500 E.
336 /338 S. 300 E.

Carrie W.

All building .inspections, plans, etc.
708 East 3900 North

B.Taylor

4/18/06
4/20/06

Murial Burton
Glenn Smith

zone verification records form file
326 West 300 South

N/C

|
Julie S.

481 North 500 East

| Julie S.

4/20/06 1 Jacob Whitley

471 North 500 East

| Julie S

4/24/06

1925 North 700 West

I

|

4/18/06

4/20/06 1 Jacob Whitley

Cory
Quackenbush

|

Julie S.

4/20/06

.40

4/27/06 1 10.40 1
4/27/06
4/26/06

1 5.10 1
N/C

1 4/25/06

Felipe Lake

1 1927 North 700 West

Boeckel

J 4/25/06

1 N/C

J 4/26/06

Victor Huhem

J 127 South 800 West

Boeckel

| 4/26/06

| N/C

1 4/26/06

Nubia Marquez 1 846 North 600 West

1 Julie S.

1 4/26/06

1 -40

1 4/26/06

Susan Tachka

B.Taylor

1 5/16/06

1 4/26/06

Robert Parsons | 337 North 700 East

Julie S.

4/26/06

1- 1

1 5/01/06

Kelly Peterson

1 1067 North 750 West

C. Hugo

5/03/06

1 11.70 1

1 5/01/06

Sergio Martinez

1169 South 760 West

Brent T.

J 5/01/06

Sally Kaukolin

228 North 500 East

Julie S.

J 5/02/06

Ed Grover

475 /477 North 800 East

MBoeckel

Timothy
Maynes

2481 West 230 South

B.Taylor

J 5/04/06

Craig Castle

241 South 400 West

Mark B.

5/04/06

N/C 1

1 5/08/06

Cliff Otis

670 East 350 North

Brian L.

5/08/06

.60

1 5/08/06

Marie Doo

150 West 300 South/ 257 South 500W

B.Taylor

5/08/06

Ceja Teadula

496 South 1330 West

B.Taylor

12/14/06

No
Plans

I 5/09/06

Chris Eiwell

Mboeckel

5/09/06

N/C

|

9.00

1

5/04/06

| 1389 South 760 West

12/14/06

5/02/06

1 N/C 1
30
cancel

N/C
cancel

12/14/06

i 745 West 100 North

5/09/06

David DeKney

2241 South Larsen Parkway

B.Taylor

cancelled
5/10/06

5/08/06

Keith Mason

1104 North 1760 West (Parkridge
Condos)

J. Bryan

5/09/06

B.Taylor

No plans
found

N/C

K.Saluone

5/11/06

10.00

2929 West 1010 North

B.Taylor

12/14/06

no
plans

584 Wymount Terrace

Nancy D.

5/15/06

722 West 100 North

Julie S.

5/16/06

5/10/06

Chharra
Enterprises

1515 South University Ave.

5/11/06

Kaye Ivie

Planning Commission meeting of
5/10/06

5/11/06

Silvia

5/F5/06 1 Matthew Willis
5/16/06

Mark
Donaldson

5/18/06

1 Nathan West

|

[ 3275 Mohican Way

|

| Brent T.

|

N/C

J

1 5/18/06

Gary E.Stone

Wells Fargo Bldg

J 5/23/06

Chris Ophar

Branbury Park Apartments

J 5/30/06

J W. Mitchell

1 6/06/06

Ryan Smith

1 6/07/06

Arlington Place / Arlington Heights
1 421 West 880 North

1 Cory B.

J N/C

J 5/25/6

Geniel D. 1 5/23/06

J N/C

1 Carrie W. 1 6/05/06

|N/C

Becca A.

Plans for Timpview High School

B.Taylor

Jeremy Zimber
or SECOR
Inter. Inc.

Provo Towne Square; Occupancy
permits, construction, Demolition

B. Taylor

1 6/07/06

Forrest Hale

800 South University Avenue

Casey P.

6/13/06

23.70 1

J 6/08/06

Scott Stone

151 East 200 North

Mboeckel

6/08/06

N/C

J

| 6/08/06

Roberto Berril

308 West 400 South

C.Hugo

6/08/06

N/C

J

1 6/08/06

Billy Arnold

846 North 600 West

Mboeckel

6/08/06

N/C

|

J 6/19/06

Susan Tachka

1389 South 760 West

B.Taylor

6/19/06

David Melton

1555 North Grandview Lane

B.Taylot

12/14/06

No
plans

6/19/06

Mel Wooden

1450 West 300 North

B.Taylor

12/14/06

no
plans

6/20/06

Phillip
Hinckley

3120 West Center

Mboeckel

6/20/06

N/C

1 6/21/06

Alan McGraw

885 east 3900 North

b.Taylor

6/26/06

26.00 1

| 6/21/06

Jeff Gardner

530 East 600 North

Mboeclel

6/21/06

N/C

| 6/21/06

Paul Webb

Copy PC meeting 6/14/06

Karen S.

7/06/06

10.00 1

6/21/06

Kyler Nichols

540,542,544 South State

Mboeckel

6/22/06

N/C 1

6/21/06

Bennett
McKenzie

3325, 3355, 3507,3521,3549 N.
University

B.Taylor

6/07/06

cancel

12/14/06

1

| Mboeckel

6/22/06

1 N/C

3362 North University Avenue

A Gulley

| 7/19/06

7/03/06 1 Dwight Green

2945 North Rolling Knolls Drive

B.Taylor

7/03/06 J Alicia Vial

1295 East Cedar Ave.

| Casey P.

7/05/06 J Nolan Devor

510 East 2200 North

| F3 .Taylor

6/22/06 1 Scott Stone
6/27/06

| June Hamblin

341/343 North 400 West

J

1

] 80.00 1

12/14/06 1 cancel

12/14/06 1 cancel

7/10/06

Land Direct /
Chris Bassett

7/11/06

David
S packman

I 7/12/06
7/12/06

J 7/17/06

all current residential projects for
1 11576 State #101A Draper Lane

Nathan
Murray

7/17/06

N/C

461 East 100 North

Mark
Boeckel

7/11/06

N/C

Louis Crandall

1 150 North 1050 East

B.Taylor

1 7/12/06

1 N/C

Tristan Last

University Plaza, Trellis On The
Green, Village At Riverwoods, Villas
1 At The Country Club

N.Murray

7/26/06

33.30

Maria Burgess

1 57 North 1000 West

Mboeckel

7/17/06

N/C

9/20//06

2.90

|

William
Middleton

2571 West 1680 North

Becca A.

1 7/17/06

Kent Monson

565 North Brookside Drive

Casey P.

7/18/06

Seunghee Han
(Susie)

The Malt Shoppe; 1290 North
University Avenue

B.Taylor

| 7/25/06

Jesse Miller

455 West 730 South

Carrie W.

7/25/06

N/C 1

1 7/27/06

Joy Astle

3844 North 370 West

B.Taylor

12/14/06

cancel

7/31/06

Eldon McKell

1562 East Oak Cliff

B.Taylor

12/14/06

no
plans

8/02/06

Keith Finlayson

1336 North 900 East

Mark
Boeckel

1 8/07/06

David Acheson

1295 East Briar

J.Stout

8/07/06

N/C

J

1 8/09/06

Randy Olsen

390 East 300 North

Skip T.

8/09/06

N/C

|

1 8/09/06

Alicia Vial

1295 Cedar Avenue

C.Potter

8/09/06

1.50

1

8/2/06

Keith Finlayson

1336 North 900 East

C.Walls

8/15/06

N/C 1

8/15/06

Gary Winterton

363 North University Avenue

B.Taylor

12/14/06

cancel

8/16/06

Nicolas
Sanchez

542 East 400 North

Boeckel

8/16/06

N/C

8/16/06

Chris Edwards

552 North 1080 West

B.Taylor

12/14/06

no
plans

7/17/06

•

8/17/06 1 Tyler Baird

59 East 500 South/215 S. 500E

| J.Stout

8/17/06

8/17/06 1 Blake Law

1732 North 450 West

| C.Potter

| 8/17/06

|

N/C 1

J .60

J

1 8/22/06

1 N/C

Mboeckel

8/23/06

N/C

4667 Hillside Drive

B.Taylor

12/14/06

no
plans

Kimball Young

2091 South Nevada Avenue

Mboeckel 1 8/28/06

N/C

|

1 8/31/06

Stephen Stone

1134 West 500 North

M.Taylor

8/31/06

N/C

|

J 8/31/06

Darrell L.Noble

1726 South Buckley Lane

B.Taylor

9/07/06

N/C

|

1 8/31/06

Jackie Peterson

476 North 200 East

Patrick Dean
McGraw

1881 West 430 South

B.Taylor

9/06/06

N/C

Conrad Monson

1050-1048 North 750 West

Michael
Leishman

645 East 600 North

Mboeckel

9/11/06

N/C

J 9/11/06

Steve Robbins

1335 North 1160 West

Casey P.

1 9/12/06

Kimball Young

556 East 300 North

Mboeckel

9/12/06

N/C

J

1 9/12/06

Linda Barnes

80 South 900 East

MBoeckel

9/12/06

N/C

J

1 9/12/06

Phil Shumway

600 North 544 East

John M.

9/12/06

N/C

J

9/13/06

Rikki Frank

4541 Windsor Drive

B.Taylor

J 9/18/06

Paul Glauser

234 North 300 East

Mboeckel

| 9/19/06

Jim Anderson

788 North 1250 East

Julie S.

1 9/19/06

Bob Oldroyd

Staff Reprot, Item 1 PC 9/13/06

M.Taylor

Robert Becerril

308 West 400 South

B.Taylor

1 9/21/06 -| Tammy Smith

690 West 890 North

John M.

9/21/06

N/C

1 9/26/06 J Bryce Robbins

1244 S. 1410 E.

| John M.

9/26/06

N/C 1

10/02/06

N/C

Chris Bramwell 1 544 East 600 North

John M.

8/23/06

Cory
Quackenbush

247 North 400 East

8/23/06

Russell
Hopkinson

I 8/28//06

| 823/06

9/06/06
| 9/07/06
9/11/06

9/20/06

9/28/06

Bob Gray

992 South University Ave. (Strip

mall)
10/02/06

Jorgen Olesen

no
plans

9/18/06

N/C

J

9/1/9-06

N/C

J

12/14/06

no
plans

B.Taylor

1

"Notice of Clean up "@ 781 East 300

So.

12/14/06

David H.

J

J

1 N/C

1 10/02/06

Stewart King

1 1000 West 600 South

Boeckel

1 10/02/06

J 12/14/06

Jan Holley

1 1675 North 200 West (lot 2)

B.Taylor

1 12/14/06

cancel

10/03/06

Brizida
Woodbury

B.Taylor

12/14/06

no
plans

1 10/05/06

Jeff Garner

J 10/10/06

Jamie Taylor

544 East 600 South

David H.

10/10/06

10/10/06

Hala Afu

4210 North Stone Crossing

Brent T.

12/14/06

no
plans

10/12/06

Lynn Tromley

1402 Green Avenue

Brent
Taylor

12/14/06

cancel

J 10/12/06

Bonnie Hamp

495 West Center

C.Branch

12/14/06

N/C 1

J 12/14/06

Dave Edwards

201 East Bay Boulevard

B.Taylor

12/1/4/06

cancel

1 10/16/06

Jared Fen

544 East 600 North

Mboeckel

10/16/06

N/C

J

1 10/16/06

Jared Fen

950 East 300 North

M.Boeckl

10/16/06

N/C

J

| 10/19/06

Craig Collette

544 East 600 North

Mboeckel

10/23/06

N/C 1

1 10/25/06

Steve Clark

1139& 1141 West 650 North

C.Walls

10/25/06

N/C

1 10/31/06

Peter Gordon

558 South State Street

John M.

10/31/06

N/C 1

Chelsea
Haviland

264 Thornberry Drive, Draper UT

11/02/06

N/C

1 11/06/06

Stuart Waldrip

218 North 50 East

C.Walls

11/06/06

1 11/08/06

William Rubio

329 North 800 East

John M.

11/08/06

N/C 1
N/C 1

11/15/06

Christian
Mealey

364 North 300 West

John M.

11/16/06

N/C

11/30/06

Alicia
Fernandes

449 West 1720 North /parking records

Becca P.

12/07/06

22.00

11/15/06

Guil Rand

2272 Mountain View Parkway

B.Taylor

11/28/06

no
plans
found

11/21/06

Kathryn
Stuedeman

464 W. 3700 N . , 404 W. 3700 N . ,
396 W. 3700 N . , 364 W. 3700 N.

12/04/06

23.90

11/02/06

1243 North Jakeview Dr.
1 544 East 600 North

1 10/5/06

John M.

|N/C 1
J N/C

|

J

Karen S.

Amanda
Klein

|

1 B.Pace

J 11/28/06

1 7-40

J Mark B.

1 11/29/06

|N/C

1 11/22/06

Serena Cofer

1 11/29/06

Dan Evans

345 North Belmont Place

12/4/06

Cory
Quackenbush

257 N. 100 East

12/04/06

Kathryn L.
Studeman

404 West 3700 North/ all related
documentation for this property

A. Klein

Kathryn L.
Studeman

364 West 3700 North/ all related
documentation for this property

12/04/06

1 458 West 400 South

J 12/07/06

no
record

A.Klein

12/07/06

10.20

MBoeckel

12/14/06

1 12.20 1

1 12/07/06

Paul Sanchez

J 12/14/06

Steve Turley

1070 South State

R.Trimble

12/14/06

N/C

J 12/14/06

Todd Welker

389 East 500 North

Mboeckel

12/14/06

N/C 1

James Clark

Erickson Farms SD/ PC minutes &
staff reports, final plat map

N.Murray

1/08/07

15.40

Ashley Johnson

360 & 466 West 4800 North

GmCaleb

1/09/07

23.00 J

Renee
Gailbraith

380 North 1020 East

Gchapple

1/08/07

N/C

1 12/21/06

Stephania Jones

653 South 880 West

Brent T.

1/09/07

11.00 1

1 12/27/06

Frank Beck

1200 North University Ave

B.Taylor

12/20/06
J 12/21/06
12/21/06

1 15, 20 ,44 East 900 North

, •

.

•

1

J

